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Pension Plans: The Discrimination Concept of
Section 401(a)-Its Workings and Effects
I. INTRODUCION
An employee pension plan qualifying under section 401(a) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 19541 provides employee remuner-
ation with substantial tax advantages to both the employee
and employer. The employee is not taxed at the time of the
employer's contribution, but at subsequent distribution when he
retires.2 Under some conditions the subsequent distribution will
receive capital gain treatment.3 The employer's contribution 4
is deductible at the time of contribution, and the income from
the pension trust is tax-exempt.5 The policy underlying these
provisions is the encouragement of employee retirement bene-
fits6 to help alleviate society's burden of supporting its senior
citizens while reducing labor turnover, maintaining labor effi-
ciency, and providing employees with a framework for a lifetime
career.
7
The Code currently provides that four requirements must
be met before a plan can qualify: (1) the plan must be for the
exclusive benefit of the employees;8 (2) under the trust instru-
ment it must be impossible, at any time before the satisfaction
of all liabilities to the employees, to divert any part of the corpus
or income to purposes other than the exclusive benefit of the
employees; 9 (3) upon termination of the plan, the employees'
rights to accrued benefits must be nonforfeitable; 10 and (4) the
plan must not discriminate in favor of upper level employees."
1. The concept of a qualified pension plan was first introduced
in the Revenue Act of 1921, § 219(f), 42 Stat. 227 (1921).
2. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 402(a) (1) [hereinafter cited by sec-
tion number only].
3. To qualify as capital gain, the entire amount must be paid
within one year from the employee's separation. Section 402(a) (2).
4. Section 404(a).
5. Section 501(a).
6. See H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942); Goldworn,
Pension Plans: Their Background, Current Trends, and an Agenda for
Inquiry, 25 OHio ST. L.J. 234, 235-36 (1964); Goodfellow, Tax Conse-
quences of Pension Trusts and Employer Purchased Annuities to Em-
ployee or Beneficiary, 39 CALIF. L. REV. 204, 204-06 (1951).
7. See Hoffman, Tax Planning in Qualified Pension and Profit-
Sharing Plans, 5 TAx COUN ELOR'S Q. 189, 192, 206-07 (1961).
8. Section 401(a).
9. Section 401 (a) (2).
10. Section 401(a) (7).
11. Sections 401(a) (4), (5).
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Failure to comply with these requirements results in taxation of
the pension trust,12 taxation of the employee at the time of the
employer's contribution,13 and loss of the employer's deduction
unless it was nonforfeitable when made. 4 This Note will ex-
plore the nondiscrimination requirement necessary for qualifi-
cation as a section 401 (a) pension plan.
The original legislation provided that a pension plan would
qualify if it benefited "some or all of [the] employees."'15 The
Treasury soon realized that this language allowed employers to
put into pension trusts what actually amounted to compensation
for the sole benefit of highly paid personnel, thereby deferring
such compensation until their retirement, at which time in-
dividual tax brackets are lower.1 6 The Revenue Act of 1942 in-
troduced the concept of discrimination into the pension plan qual-
ification requirements, disqualifying any plan which discrimi-
nated in favor of employees who were officers, shareholders,
supervisors, or highly compensated employees.
The discrimination concept of sections 139 (a) (3), (4), and
(5) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code is incorporated verbatim
into sections 401 (a) (3), (4), and (5) of the 1954 Code. These
provisions deny qualification to any plan which favors upper
level employees in eligibility or coverage requirements 17 or in
the scale of benefits or contributions.'
12. Section 401(a).
13. Section 402(a).
14. Section 404.
15. Revenue Act of 1921, § 219(f), 42 Stat. 227 (1921).
16. See JoiNT COMM. oN TAx EVASION AND AVOIDANCE HARINGs,
75th Cong., 1st Sess. 290 (1937).
17. Section 401(a) (3).
18. Section 401(a) (4). Because of the tax consequences of non-
qualification, advance determination letters are available through the
District Director, advising employers as to whether or not the plan
initially qualifies and whether or not subsequent modifications will
result in disqualification, see Rev. Proc. 67-4, 1967 INT. REV. BULL. No. 1,
at 27; Goodman, Pension and Profit-Sharing Rulings and Procedures,
N.Y.U. 17th INST. oN FED. TAX. 993 (1959). While the letters are not
binding upon the courts, see Rev. Proc. 67-4, 1967 INT. REV. BtLL. No. 1,
at 31, favorable letters are apparently binding upon the Treasury and
cannot be revoked without a change in the law or facts. See Time Oil
Co. v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1958); Dejoy Stores, Inc. v.
Ryan, 229 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1956); H.S.D. Co. v. Kavanagh, 191 F.2d 831
(6th Cir. 1951); but see Rev. Proc. 67-1, 1967 INT. REV. BULL. No. 1, at
14, 16. In spite of such a letter, the Commissioner may contend that,
although the plan qualified as proposed, it failed to qualify in opera-
tion, see Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b) (3) (1956); Greenwald v. Commissioner,
366 F.2d 538, 540 (2d Cir. 1966).
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II. COVERAGE REQUIREMENTS
A. THE PERCENTAGE TEST
To comply with the coverage requirements, the plan must
meet either the mechanical percentage test19 or the nondiscrimi-
natory classification test.20 Under the former, if seventy per cent
of all employees actually receive benefits, or if seventy per cent
of all employees are eligible and eighty per cent of those eligible
actually receive benefits, the plan's coverage qualifies. The
term "all employees" does not include those working less than
twenty hours in any week or five months in any year; nor does
it include those not working the specified number of years re-
quired by the plan, not to exceed five.21
B. THE NONDISCRIMIvATORY CLAssIFIcATIoN TEST
Because the required percentage in the mechanical test is
often too difficult to meet,22 most plans attempt to qualify their
coverage under the nondiscriminatory classification test23 which
allows qualification if the classification of benefiting employees
is found, by the Treasury, not to be discriminatory in favor of
officers, shareholders, supervisors, or highly compensated per-
sonnel.24
1. Discretion of the Service
Coverage under the classification test will be met if the
classification is ". . . found by the Secretary or his delegate not
to be discriminatory ... "25 Because the majority of plans qual-
ify for coverage under this rule, the scope of the Service's dis-
cretionary power in this determination is significant. The Com-
missioner has acquiesced that a determination can be over-
ruled by showing an "abuse of discretion, unreasonableness, or
arbitrariness."2 6  This limitation has been noted in a district
court;2 7 it appears, however, that the Tax Court imposes greater
19. Section 401(a) (3) (A).
20. Section 401(a) (3) (B).
21. Section 401(a) (3) (A).
22. See Goldstein, Integrating Pension and Profit-Sharing Plans
with Social Security, N.Y.U. 15TH INsT. o T FED. TAX. 1165, 1167 (1957).
23. See Bomar, Requirements for Qwzlification of Plans (Compen-
sation Problems, Pensions and Profit Sharing), N.Y.U. 13TH INsT. ON
FED. TAX. 395, 404-05 (1955).
24. Section 401(a) (3) (B).
25. Id.
26. Pepsi-Cola Niagara Bottling Corp., 48 T.C. 75, 82 (1967).
27. Duguid & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 278 F. Supp. 101, 105-06
(N.D.N.Y. 1967).
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restraints. A recent holding set aside the Commissioner's de-
termination of discrimination because it was not "... reason-
able, rational, and supportable.1
2 8
2. The Prohibited Group
The Commissioner's determination on whether or not a
classification discriminates in favor of the prohibited group is to
a large extent dependent upon the definition of the various
employee categories making up such group. The term "stock-
holders" does not include employees owning an insignificant
number of shares and exercising no control over the corpora-
tion,29 but includes stockholders of the parent corporation which
owns the employer corporation."0 Since the statute does not
expressly mention relatives of stockholders, it has been con-
tended that they are not among the prohibited group.31 How-
ever, to allow a stockholder-employee to meet the nondiscrimina-
tory requirements by merely transferring stock of the employer
corporation to his wife or children seems entirely inconsistent
with the intent of the Congress in enacting the stockholder
discrimination provision.32 Such a result would allow qualifica-
tion of a plan where the economic benefits went exclusively to
stockholders to the exclusion of the general employees. There-
fore, it is not surprising that the Service has ruled an employee
a constructive stockholder if either his spouse or minor lineal
28. Ray Cleaners, Inc., 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 23, 28 (1968). The
Commissioner determined that a plan benefiting three of twenty-two
employees, the three benefiting being the president and controlling
stockholder and two workers receiving salaries in excess of all but one
of the other employees, was discriminatory. In ruling that such a deter-
mination can be overturned by the courts, the court significantly weak-
ened the authority delegated to the Commissioner since the statute would
have virtually the same effect had the words "by the Secretary" been
omitted, leaving the discretion in the hands of the courts. The Service
should not be given free rein; its determinations should be subject to
judicial reversal if clearly arbitrary or unreasonable. However, dele-
gation of authority by Congress should be given effect by interpreting
§ 401(a) (3) to mean that the employer, if he cannot qualify under the
mechanical test of § 401(a) (3) (A), must subject himself to the reason-
able determination of the Service with respect to discriminatory coverage.
29. See Gordon, Discrimination Problems in the Drafting and in
the Operation of Pension and Profit-Sharing Plans, N.Y.U. 14TH INsT.
ON FED. TAX. 1153, 1155 (1956).
30. I.T.: P.S. No. 20 (1944).
31. Gordon, supra note 29, at 1156. The author reasons that where
the statute intended to include stockholders' relatives, it did so ex-
pressly, as in § 267 of the Code; therefore, a fortiori, such relatives
were not intended to be within the prohibited group of § 401(a).
32. Notes 6 & 16 supra.
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descendants are stockholders,33 although this position has not
yet been tested in court.
Officers can usually be identified by examining the cor-
porate bylaws.3 4 It has been held, however, that those employ-
ees given a nominal title so as to have the authority to sign
checks, affix the corporate seal, and perform other ministerial
duties are not "officers" within the meaning of the statute.3,
The prohibition regarding supervisors refers to "persons whose
principal duties consist in supervising the work of other em-
ployees .... "36 It has been held that an employee devoting
twenty-five per cent of her time to supervising was not a mem-
ber of the statute's prohibited group,37 and one author con-
tends that an employee is not a "supervisor" unless more than
half his time is devoted to supervisory duties.38
The most troublesome problem under the nondiscriminatory
classification test is identification of the highly compensated
employees. It has been suggested that the standard be ab-
solute, such that employees earning over, for example, $5000,
would be within the prohibited group.39 This contention is
based on the assertion that the statutory nondiscrimination re-
quirement is aimed at preventing the use of qualified plans to
aid high bracket taxpayers in reducing their taxes. If so, the
significant factor should be the employee's absolute tax bracket
and not his relative compensation as compared to other em-
ployees.40  This view is supported by a holding of the Tax
Court that ". . . the term [highly compensated] may be relative
but we believe . . . it should be more related to compensation
standards which might produce some rather substantial tax
33. See LT. 3661, 1944 CUM. BuLL. 315. But see I.T. 4020, 1950-2
Cum. BULL. 61. The issue is often inconsequential as most shareholder
employees are likely to be "officers" or "highly compensated" and
thus be members of the prohibited group regardless.
34. Gordon, supra note 29, at 1156.
35. LT.: P.S. No. 4 (1944).
36. Sections 401(a) (3) (B), (a) (4).
37. Marjorie Birnie, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 867, 871 (1953).
Therein the employee spent 75% of her -time performing clerical duties
and 25% supervising one employee in the preparation of reports.
38. Gordon, supra note 29, at 1157. But see Pepsi-Cola Niagara
Bottling Corp., 48 T.C. 75, 84 (1967), where the court said there was
considerable doubt that an employee spending only 50% of his time
supervising was within the prohibited group.
39. Gordon, supra note 29, at 1157. See Ets-Hokin & Galvan
Inc., 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 717, 720 (1962), where all employees re-
ceiving over $10,000 were considered within the prohibited group.
40. Gordon, supra note 29, at 1158.
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avoidance .. "41
Although it is true that Congress sought to deprive high
bracket taxpayers of a tax reduction via a qualified plan, it is
clear that this was not its primary motive. The Committee
Report states that the requirements of nondiscrimination are to
guarantee ". . . that the pension plan would be operated for the
welfare of the employees generally .... High salaried employ-
ees should not be favored at the expense of the low-paid em-
ployees.142  One congressman stated that the plans must not
"... discriminate in favor of high-salaried . . . employees as
against low-salaried employees."43 These comments seem to re-
flect a congressional intent to deny qualification to plans which
include higher paid employees while excluding the lower paid,
regardless of the absolute compensation of the various partici-
pants. The relative standard, therefore, appears to be prefer-
able in fostering plans for the welfare of employees generally
and the cases44 ruling against the Commissioner on this point
seem incorrectly decided.
3. Classifications
The prohibited employees are often prime beneficiaries of
plans having both discriminatory and nondiscriminatory clas-
sifications. Plans have been limited to employees who are sal-
aried or clerical, employed in a specified department or geo-
graphical location, employed for a designated length of time,
having reached a specified age, or having made a required con-
tribution to the plan. Such classifications are not on their face
discriminatory and each must be analyzed seriatim to determine
which classifications will be disallowed because of their dis-
criminatory effects.
The Code provides that a classification limited to salaried
or clerical employees 45 will not, by itself, disqualify a plan.46
41. Pepsi-Cola Niagara Bottling Corp., 48 T.C. 75, 84 (1967), appeal
docketed, 2d Cir., Sept. 11, 1967.
42. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) (emphasis
added).
43. 88 CONG. REc. 6378 (1942) (emphasis added).
44. In Pepsi-Cola Niagara Bottling Corp., 48 T.C. 75 (1967), those
receiving benefits had salaries in excess of $9,000 while those excluded
were paid less than $7,500. Similarly, in Ray Cleaners, Inc., 27 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 23 (1968), the three participating employees earned in
excess of $5,200 while those excluded received compensation from
$20.35 to $4640.10.
45. Section 401(a) (5).
46. Rev. Rul. 66-13, 1966-1 Cum. BULL. 73.
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If, however, the classification as designed or operated limits
participation to employees in whose favor discrimination is pro-
hibited, the plan's coverage will not qualify.47 While the posi-
tion of the Commissioner is not entirely clear, revenue rulings
indicate what the Commissioner will consider discriminatory.
For example, the adoption of a salaried-only plan by an employer
having twenty employees, of which seventeen were not salaried,
left only officer-stockholders participating and, therefore, con-
stituted prohibited discrimination.413  Similarly, where there
were fifty hourly employees and six salaried, of which five
were officers or stockholders, the salaried-only plan failed to
qualify.49 On the other hand, a salaried-only plan was not found
to be discriminatory where twenty-six of 109 employees were
salaried and of these twenty-six, eleven were officers, share-
holders, or highly compensated.50 It thus appears that the
Treasury will approve salaried-only plans if a substantial por-
tion of those covered are not members of the prohibited group.
One court has held that a salaried-only classification will fail
to win approval if the members covered under such a category
are all within the prohibited group.5 ' However, other cases indi-
cate that the classification is not discriminatory even if half of
the salaried employees covered are members of the prohibited
group.52 It may be concluded, therefore, that the discretion of
the Service to disqualify under section 401 (a) (3) (B) is limited
to classifications where at least more than half of those partici-
pating are supervisors, shareholders, officers, or highly compen-
sated.53
47. Rev. Rul. 55-81, 1955-1 Cum. BuiL. 392.
48. Id.
49. Rev. Rul. 66-13, 1966-1 Cum. BuLL. 73.
50. Rev. Rul. 66-12, 1966-1 Cum. BimL. 72. The remaining fifteen
participants had substantially the same income as the excluded hourly
workers.
51. See Greenwald v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 538, 540 (2d Cir.
1966). In Greenwald the coverage was satisfactory at inception, but
the employer discontinued one line of business, thereby terminating
the employment of all his personnel. When only the employer benefited
from the plan, it failed to qualify. However, a plan will not fail if it
covers all employees, even though they are all highly compensated
stockholders of a close corporation, because both tests of § 401(a) (3)
are met. One hundred per cent coverage meets the mechanical test
while the classification test is met because there is no discrimination.
52. See, e.g., Pepsi-Cola Niagara Bottling Corp., 48 T.C. 75 (1967);
Ryan School Retirement Trust, 24 T.C. 127 (1955).
53. Clearly these plans were unable to meet the 70% coverage
test, as is most often the case in salaried-only plans.
The reasons for the employer's discrimination are apparently irrele-
vant; the fact of discriminatibn is detarminative. Thus, although an
1204 [Vol. 52:1198
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Plans which cover only those employees with a specified
number of years service have qualified under section 401(a) (3)
(B)." Although the classification is latently discrimina-
tory, since it favors employees who are more likely to be
members of some prohibited group as compared to less senior
workers, allowance has been made because of the salutary ef-
fect of such classifications on employee turnover. A length of
service classification will not be deemed discriminatory if the
period is reasonable considering the turnover 55 situation of the
employer.0 Likewise, plans which cover only those employees
who have reached a stated age will qualify if the age re-
quirement is reasonable to secure the continued employment of
personnel and not designed or operated to benefit primarily mem-
bers of prohibited groups.57 If higher-ups participate under such
plans, however, it is imperative that they meet all requirements
requisite to a new employee's participation. For example, if
the plan provides that new employees will be eligible only after
five years service, any member of a prohibited group who par-
ticipates must have five years service or the coverage require-
ments are discriminatory and the plan will fail.5 8 It can be
assumed that classifications of this type, which produce cover-
age primarily for prohibited employees, will fail to qualify un-
der similar tests imposed on salaried-only classifications. 59
employer is precluded from granting benefits to rank and file salaried
personnel because of a union agreement, discrimination is not justified.
See Pepsi-Cola Niagara Bottling Corp., 48 T.C. 75 (1967); Rev. Rul. 66-
14, 1966-1 Cum. BULL. 75.
54. See Sherwood Swan & Co., 42 T.C. 299 (1964); Ets-Hokin &
Galvan, Inc., 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 717 (1962). A length of service
requirement is not the same as a vesting requirement. In the former,
the employee must work a specified number of years before any
contributions are credited to his account. In the latter, the employee is
being credited with contributions during the waiting period but has
no property interest in the contributions. If he leaves his job prior to
the expiration of the waiting period, he forfeits the contributions
credited to his account.
55. In Ets-Hokin & Galvan, Inc., 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 717 (1962),
a five-year length of service requirement was allowed. The court recog-
nized that because the employees were largely wives of naval personnel
at a nearby naval base the employer was justified in excluding short-
term employees, id. at 724. A five-year length of service requirement
is allowed to employers who qualify their coverage under § 401(a)
(3) (A).
56. 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 724.
57. I.T.: P.S. No. 22 (1944). See, e.g., Ray Cleaners, Inc., 27
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 23 (1968) (25 years old); Ets-Hokin & Galvan,
Inc., 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 717 (1962) (25 years old).
58. Rev. Rul. 65-178, 1965-2 Cum. BULL. 94, 113.
59. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
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A plan may be made available only to those employees who
contribute with the employer.6 0 In such plans, the coverage is
discriminatory if the required contribution is burdensome. It
is obvious that a required contribution of fifty per cent of
salary would result in participation by the highly paid per-
sonnel to the exclusion of the rank and file workers. 1 The
Treasury, therefore, has ruled that employee contribution re-
quirements exceeding six per cent of salary will disqualify the
plan as discriminatory.62
The above discussion represents the various criteria for qual-
ification of coverage. Any single classification could be non-
discriminatory while in combination with others it becomes
discriminatory. On the other hand, an employer may provide for
more than one plan, in which case the coverage requirements
might be met by the combination of plans where an individual
plan might fail.6 3 In addition to meeting the coverage require-
ments, however, a plan must not manipulate the scale of bene-
fits or contributions in such a way as to result in discriminatory
treatment favoring members of the prohibited group.64
III. CONTRIBUTIONS OR BENEFITS
A. ALTERNATIVE REQuIREMENTS
To qualify under section 401 (a) (4), the contributions or
benefits must not discriminate in favor of stockholders, officers,
supervisors, or highly paid personnel. It is not necessary that
both the contributions and the benefits be free from discrimina-
tion. The requirement is stated in the alternative to give effect
to both nondiscriminatory contributions in profit sharing and
money purchase plans, and nondiscriminatory benefits in pension
plans generally. 5 In the profit sharing plans, a certain amount,
60. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-3(d) (1956). See also Rev. Rul. 65-178, 65
CuM. BULL. 94, 113-14.
61. R. SAMUELSON, PRINCIPLES OF .EcoNoMICS 217-20 (3d ed. 1958).
62. Rev. Rul. 65-178, 1965-2 CuM. BULL. 94, 114. In Ray Cleaners,
Inc., 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 23 (1968), only two of seven employees
asked to participate accepted a plan calling for a 2% contribution.
Employees declining to participate under such requirements can be
forever barred from the plan, but it is imperative that the employee
is given adequate notice, and the consequences of his failure to comply
must be clearly presented to him. See Rev. Rul. 59-185, 1959-1 CuM.
BULL. 86.
63. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-3 (f) (1956).
64. Section 401(a) (4).
65. See Dederick, What Constitutes Discrimination in Pension and
Profit-Sharing Plans?, 22 J. TAxAiON 272, 273 (1965).
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based on profits, is contributed and used to fund benefits which
are actuarially determined. If these contributions do not dis-
criminate in favor of higher-ups, the plan qualifies even though
employees near retirement at the commencement of the plan will
benefit the least, since few contributions will have been made
to them. In pension plans, the employee is given specified bene-
fits at retirement and, if these benefits are uniformly granted
to employees, the plan will qualify even though a larger contri-
bution will be required to fund the benefits of employees near
retirement at the commencement of the plan.
B. GEARE TO COMPENSATION
The statute provides that contributions and benefits may be
commensurate with the employee's compensation without being
discriminatory.6° A requirement that the plan give absolutely
equal benefits or contributions to each worker would make the
plan insignificant to highly paid personnel, or so costly as to be
prohibitory. Bonuses may be included in compensation for the
purpose of determining benefits or contributions, if the bonuses
are a basic component and are regularly paid.67 Contributions
or benefits based partly on bonuses which are paid at the dis-
cretion of the employer could result in disqualification of the
plan because of the ability to manipulate them in favor of pro-
hibited groups.6 To justify the use of bonuses given primarily
to higher-ups, tax counsel should be prepared to show that
these bonuses had been given in prior years. 69 Similarly, over-
time pay and commissions actually earned and a part of the basic
compensation may be included. In fact, failure to include over-
time which is a basic and regular part of the compensation of
the rank and file workers could result in prohibited discrimina-
tion.
In plans calling for benefits related to the pensioner's salary
at his retirement, discrimination can result when the employer
makes substantial increases in the compensation of higher-ups
during their final year of employment.7 0  Such a plan would
probably not be questioned if the benefits were based on the
pensioner's average salary over the last five years of his employ-
ment.71
66. Section 401(a) (5).
67. Id.
68. Dederick, supra note 65, at 273.
69. Id.
70. Rev. Rul. 65-178, 1965-2 Cum. BuLL. 94, 123.
71. Id.
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C. CONTRIBUTIONS--PROFIT SHAMiNG PLANS
Profit sharing plans are funded via a percentage of profits
allocated to each employee on the basis of some specified
formula. The percentage of profits contributed need not be
provided by a fixed and definite formula,72 but the employer
is allowed to vary his contributions as his needs and resources
demand.7 3 However, the formula on which he allocates this
contribution among the individual participants must be defi-
nite.7 4 Neither the formula for the percentage of profits put into
the plan as a whole, nor the formula for the allocation of that
percentage to each individual worker, may discriminate in favor
of stockholders, officers, supervisors, or highly paid person-
nel.7 5 For example, if a group comprised primarily of prohibited
employees received eight per cent of the profits, while the
other group of employees received five per cent of the profits,
the contribution would be discriminatory and the plan would not
qualify.76 Likewise, if all employees, as a group, received eight
per cent of the employer's profits and members of the prohibited
group were allocated a larger individual contribution out of this
eight per cent, the contribution would be discriminatory and
again the plan would fail to qualify.77 Such a differential is
not discriminatory, of course, when it results merely from the
differences in the individual employee's compensation. 8
The Tax Court has ruled that where more than fifty per
cent of the contribution went to stockholders, there was no
discrimination when the contributlions bore a uniform rela-
tionship to compensation.7 9 Thus, it appears that any contri-
bution based on a uniformly applied ratio to compensation will
72. See Lincoln Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 326 (6th Cir.
1951). However, if there is no definite formula an accrual taxpayer
will not receive a deduction unless, prior to the end of the taxable
year, he has decided upon the amount of the contribution and incurred
a liability to pay it. See Treas. Reg. § 1.404 (a) -1(c) (1956).
73. Gordon, supra note 29, at 1172.
74. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b) (1) (ii) (1956).
75. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-4(a) (2) (iii) (1956).
76. I.T. 3678, 1944 CuM. BuLL. 321.
77. I.T. 3685, 1944 CuM. BuLL. 324.
78. Section 401(a) (5).
79. See Volckening, 13 T.C. 733 (1949). The Service had once ruled
that a plan would not be discriminatory in favor of stockholders if
the contributions required for employees with more than 10% of the
voting stock did not exceed 30% of the total contribution for all partici-
pants. I.T. 3674, 1944 Cum. BuLL. 315. Volckening overruled this
ruling and the Treasury has acquiesced, by revoking it. See I.T. 4020,
1950-2 CuM. BuLL. 61.
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qualify regardless of variances in benefits. This is in keeping
with the alternative language of section 401(a) (4) and the allow-
ances of section 401(a) (5).
D. BENEFITS-PENSION PLANS
A plan might provide an annuity of x dollars per year for y
years for each employee at retirement. If these benefits are not
favorable to the prohibited group the plan qualifies, even though
the yearly contributions needed to fund such benefits for em-
ployees who are near retirement at the commencement of the
plan, who may very well be primarily higher-ups, will be
greater than for the younger workers.
Benefits, like contributions, may be based upon compensa-
tion without being discriminatory. 0 Such benefits, however,
have a built-in potential for discrimination if based upon the em-
ployee's compensation at the commencement of the plan. The
benefits of the personnel near retirement would often be based
upon their highest or nearly highest salary level, while the
benefits to the workers with short service would often be based
upon their lowest or nearly lowest salary level. To eliminate
these discriminatory results a provision must be made for uni-
form increases in benefits with increased compensation.81
E. OTHR PROBLEMS nT BENEFITS OR CoNTIBuTIoNs
1. Years Service Credits
Although the statute expressly allows contributions based
on the employee's compensation,82 there is no such allowance for
the employee's years of service. Because employers often wish
to provide larger contributions to or benefits for employees with
longer service, the circumstances under which credit given for
years service will not result in prohibited discrimination 3 must
be examined.
The Treasury has indicated that the use of years service
credits will not result in discrimination if prohibited employees
do not receive a contribution or benefit which, as a percentage
of salary, is larger than that received by the rank and file
workers8 4 In other words, years service credits cannot be used
80. Section 401(a) (5).
81. Rev. Rul. 65-178, 1965-2 Cum. BuLL. 94, 123; Mm. 5677, 1944
Cum. BuLL. 320.
82. Section 401(a) (5).
83. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-4(a) (2) (iii) (1956).
84. I.T. 3685, 1944 Cum. BuLL. 324; I.T. 3686, 1944 Cum. BuLL. 326.
19681 1209
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
to create any greater differential in contributions or benefits be-
tween the rank and file and the higher-ups than is possible by
the use of a uniform relationship between contributions or bene-
fits and level of compensation. Because the level of the em-
ployee's compensation is customarily related to his years service,
separate use of years service credits is often redundant in re-
warding long-standing personnel and, therefore, because of the
potential discrimination, should be avoided. Even if the years
service criteria does not result in -prohibited discrimination at
the inception of the plan, higher-ups as a group often continue
in service longer than rank and file employees, thereby re-
ceiving greater contributions or benefits each year. Because
of certain difficulties in amending contribution or benefit sched-
ules of plans, the prevention of this discrimination subsequent
to the plan's inception might be impossible.
2. Vesting
Vesting is the employee's acquisition of a property interest
in the contributions made to his account which is not contingent
upon his continuation of employment. Vesting is not a require-
ment for qualification under section 401(a) and, therefore, de-
ferred vesting, like the length of service requirement, 5 is used
by. employers to discourage employee turnover. Many employ-
ees cannot be considered participants in these plans because it is
probable that they will separate prior to the vesting of their
interest due to the lengthy waiting period imposed by the
plan.8 6 Stockholders, officers, supervisors, and highly com-
pensated employees customarily remain employed for a longer
duration than rank and file workers and, therefore, potential
discrimination looms over all deferrel vesting requirements.
Although the Treasury has ruled that discrimination will
depend upon the facts of each case and that an employer with a
large turnover will not receive a favorable advance determina-
tion if vesting periods are excessively long,8 7 the courts have not
disqualified a single plan because of excessive waiting require-
ments. In Sherwood Swan & Company,8 a plan with a ten-year
waiting period was approved. In that case a substantial num-
ber of employees did not remain long enough to qualify, and
only a few, including the sole stockholder and president, ac-
85. See note 54 supra.
86. See Dederick, supra note 65, at 273.
87. Rev. Rul. 65-178, 1965-2 Cum. BLL. 94, 120.
88. 42 T.C. 299 (1964).
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quired vested interests. The court said: "The plan is to benefit
permanent as distinguished from transient employees. It is to be
expected that the company's chief stockholder and managing
officer will be the most permanent of the employees covered
by the plan.""9 In Ryan School Retirement Trust,90 a ten-year
requirement resulted in a plan under which 110 rank and file
employees failed to qualify, leaving only ten participants with
vested interests, half of whom were members of the prohibited
group. The court, in sustaining the plan, held that discrimina-
tion favoring the permanent as against the impermanent em-
ployees is not the type of discrimination contemplated by the
statute."1
However, it is to be expected that the Service will continue to
challenge such plans. When the permanent personnel are pri-
marily higher-ups, the discrimination is precisely the type which
the statute sought to prevent. Furthermore, under these cases,
the management of a declining business could initiate a profit
sharing plan with a vesting requirement that no employee cur-
rently meets, begin contributing to the plan and taking the ac-
companying deduction, and then systematically terminate each
employee before his interest vests, applying the forfeited inter-
ests to the remaining participants who will probably be select
upper level employees. Thus, holding that plans which merely
favor permanent employees are not discriminatory not only de-
feats the purpose of the statute, but opens the door to undesir-
able abuse.92
3. Forfeitures
Where there is deferred vesting, there are forfeited contri-
butions from separated employees. The disposal of such forfei-
tures will depend upon the type of plan involved. In pension
plans, the statute provides that forfeitures from such plans
"must not be applied to increase the benefits any employee
would otherwise receive. '93 The regulations command that
these forfeitures "be used as soon as possible to reduce the em-
ployer's contribution under the plan."94 The reason advanced for
89. Id. at 307.
90. 24 T.C. 127 (1955).
91. Id. at 134.
92. The holding could be justified on other grounds, however. The
plan was salaried-only and only one-half were members of the pro-
hibited group. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
93. Section 401(a) (8).
94. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-7(a) (1963).
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this requirement is that benefits of a qualified pension plan must
be definitely determinable, 5 and this is impossible if forfeitures
could accrue to the benefit of the remaining employees.9 6
Profit sharing plans are not subject to the requirement of
determinable benefits, 97 since the benefits bear a direct rela-
tionship to a specific percentage of profits, which are not pre-
dictable. Forfeitures under profit sharing plans may, there-
fore, benefit the remaining employees if discrimination does not
result thereby. How the forfeiture should be distributed to the
remaining participants has not been expressly decided. How-
ever, since forfeitures are no different from other contributions
to the plan, it might be assumed that the rule governing the
allocation of contributions should apply, and the relationship
of each employee's allocation to his salary must be uniform
among all the remaining participants.
4. Integration
The Code provides that a plan will not be considered dis-
criminatory merely because it excludes those employees whose
remuneration is wholly wages, or because contributions or bene-
fits based on compensation exclusive of wages differs from those
based on total compensation. 98 Wages, as defined under section
3121 of the Code, constitute remuneration up to the Social
Security base, i.e., up to the upper limit of compensation on which
employers must contribute a certain percentage thereof for the
funding of benefits under the Social Security Act. This allow-
ance permits employers who are contributing to Social Security
on each employee's income up to the Social Security base, say
$6600, to make comparable contributions on income in excess of
$6600 to supplement Social Security contributions for more high-
ly paid employees.
A plan excluding employees whose remuneration is wholly
wages will qualify if properly integrated so that the relative
differences in benefits resulting from such a classification are
offset by the Social Security benefits attributable to the em-
95. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b) (1) (i) (1964); Rev. Rul. 65-178, 1965-2
Cum. BULL. 94, 105.
96. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-7(b) (1963). This requirement could re-
sult in greater discrimination in closed corporations. Although the
remaining participants in the plan would not share the forfeitures,
stockholders would benefit from the requirement because it relieves the
corporation of a liability to the plan to the extent of the forfeiture.
97. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-4(a) (1) (iii) (1963).
98. Section 401(a) (5).
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ployer's contribution. 9 Similarly, a plan which bases benefits
on that part of the employee's compensation in excess of the
Social Security base will not be discriminatory if those benefits
are equivalent to the Social Security benefits provided by the
employer's contribution with respect to the first $6600 of com-
pensation.100
IV. CONCLUSION
To make consideration of the above material meaningful it
is necessary to ask (1) whether the pension plan provisions of
the Code are intended to encourage social action; (2) if so, what
social action is sought to be encouraged by these provisions in
general and the discrimination concept in particular; and (3) in
light of the desired objectives, whether the discrimination provi-
sions are effective in achieving them.
The legislative history 0 1 and comments in the area'0 2 indi-
cate that the provisions were meant to encourage private re-
tirement plans to aid society in its burden of caring for retired
persons. The discrimination concept was intended to guarantee
that qualification and the accompanying tax advantages would
be available only to the employers who offered benefits to their
employees generally rather than to upper level employees ex-
clusively.103
To contend that the prime purpose of the discrimination
concept was to prevent tax avoidance by high bracket taxpay-
ers'04 is to compromise logic. Tax avoidance could have easily
been prevented by repealing the pension plan provisions and
their accompanying tax advantages altogether. Congress, of
course, chose not to do so. Considering the individuals in the
prohibited group, it seems clear that the concept was aimed at
encouraging plans for the benefit of employees generally. If
concerned only with preventing income deferment by high
bracket taxpayers, Congress might have put only highly compen-
sated employees in the prohibited category. Instead, supervisors,
officers, and stockholders were similarly included. 0 5
It is unclear that a salaried-only plan meets the nondis-
criminatory requirement merely because most of the salaried
99. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-3(e) (1) (1956).
100. Id.
101. See note 6 supra.
102. Id.
103. See text accompanying notes 40 & 41 supra.
104. Gordon, supra note 29, at 1158.
105. Sections 401(a) (3) (B), (a) (4).
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participants are not higher-ups. If these plans can qualify with-
out any reference to the benefits of the nonsalaried employees,
incongruities arise. If an employer can exclude employees whose
compensation is wholly wages only upon equating the benefits
of the participants with the benefits provided for the wage earn-
ers under Social Security,10 6 it is difficult to rationalize the
qualification of salaried-only plans which avoid these integra-
tion requirements without giving undue emphasis to mere form.
Furthermore, a plan providing benefits for wage-earners as
well as salaried personnel is discriminatory if the benefits favor
the higher-ups, 10 7 whereas a plan which provides no benefits
whatsoever for the wage-earners is likely to qualify, since it can
avoid the discrimination provision merely by insuring that the
salaried participants are not primarily members of the pro-
hibited group. 08 Thus, the merits of continuing to allow salar-
ied-only classifications can be sericusly questioned. Although
there was a recent recommendation to eliminate the salaried-
only option from the Code, 09 it was not acted upon on the ground
that mandatory coverage of all employees would often be un-
realistic where a particular group of employees indicate a prefer-
ence for a different type of benefit, such as a cash wage in-
crease or some type of fringe benefit." 0 But this argument can
be advanced in support of almost all discriminatory plans, as it
is not uncommon for upper level employees to want a retirement
plan while the rank and file prefer immediate wage increases or
their equivalent."' The argument seems to be valid only in
those cases where the wage-earners collectively bargain, being
able to reject a retirement plan in favor of other benefits. It
seems desirable to allow salaried-only plans only in cases where
the employer shows that pension benefits were genuinely of-
fered to the bargaining unit, but rejected in favor of other
benefits.
Currently, one-half of the nonfarm labor force is covered
by private pension plans.1 2  However, because of deferred
106. See text accompanying note 99 supra.
107. Section 401(a) (4).
108. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
109. Address by S. Surrey, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury,
American Pension Conference, May 11, 1967. See 7 CCH 1968 STAND.
FED. TAX REP. 71,089.
110. Id.
111. This would be especially so if the employee had to contribute
himself or remain for many years before acquiring a vesting interest
in the benefits.
112. A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, PIMLIc PocY AND PRIVATE PEN-
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vesting, these figures are very misleading. Two-thirds of em-
ployees covered must remain with the same employer for at least
fifteen years to qualify for a vested interest."3  It has been
estimated that less than twenty per cent of the employees now
covered will actually receive cash benefits from the plans," 4
average length of continuous service being approximately four
years."
5
In light of the above, as well as the litigation discussed
earlier,"" it is clear that deferred vesting is working against the
rank and file employees to the detriment of society. Fewer
retired employees are able adequately to provide for themselves,
evidenced by the fact that currently over forty per cent of those
classified as "poverty stricken" are over the age of sixty-five." 7
Labor mobility, considered essential to an economy character-
ized by rapid technological change, is significantly retarded." 8
Finally, deferred vesting fosters age discrimination in employ-
ment in that older workers without any vested pension credits
from past employment will probably not be hired when employ-
ers find the annual cost of funding a pension plan including such
workers prohibitive." 9
Employers object to early vesting because of its high cost
and the lessening of their economic hold over employees, 120 but
these contentions lose their persuasiveness when the issue is con-
sidered from a broader viewpoint. With respect to the employer's
economic hold on the employee, many argue that this interest
must at some point give way to the interest of society in a fluid
labor supply. The employers' contention that, without deferred
vesting, the high cost will eliminate their plans altogether is
similarly nonpersuasive. To prevail, employers must show
that the value of pension plans with a long vesting period is
sIoN PROGRAMS vi (Jan. 1965). See also Goldworn, Pension Plans:
Their Background, Current Trends, and an Agenda for Inquiry, 25
OHIO ST. L.J. 234, 240 (1964).
113. BUREAu OF LABOR STATisTIcs, LABOR MoBa.Tmy AND PRivATE
PENSION PLANS, BULL. No. 1407, at 12, 44 (June, 1964).
114. Pension Fund Regulations Being Studied by Congress, AD.
MANAGEMENT, June, 1967, at 31.
115. Hamel, Job Tenure of Workers, MONTHLY LABOR REV., Jan.,
1967, at 37.
116. See text accompanying notes 88 & 90 supra.
117. See Goldworn, supra note 112, at 234.
118. See Hoffman, supra note 7, at 218.
119. R. Bagley, An Analysis of Portability and Vesting Rights in
Pension Plans 9, Jan. 20, 1968 (unpublished thesis at Graduate School
of Business Administration, University of Minnesota).
120. Hoffman, supra note 7, at 211.
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such that it outweighs the tax loss to the Treasury resulting
from their qualification. Writers recognize121 and the cases
show122 that plans with substantial waiting periods benefit pri-
marily the executive and shareholder personnel. Such a
benefit is of minimal social value in terms of combating post-
retirement poverty. On the other hand, the favored tax treat-
ment allowed these plans has been estimated to exceed one bil-
lion dollars each year. 23 It is clear, therefore, that the Treas-
ury is subsidizing plans which are of primary benefit to upper
level employees, contrary to the objectives of the pension statute.
Both the salaried-only allowance of section 401 (a) (5) and
the absence of any standards for vesting seem inconsistent
with the social goals of the pension plan provisions and, to
the extent that these attributes of the statute fail to encour-
age pension benefits for the general employees, they are objec-
tionable. Salaried-only classifications which are not integrated
with benefits for the remaining employees should be disquali-
fied unless the employer can show that the remaining employees
collectively rejected a comparable plan which was genuinely of-
fered.
Vesting requirements should become imperative by statute.
Immediate vesting is probably not necessary, since employee
mobility would not be unduly hampered by a deferred vest-
ing requirement of relatively short length. Under a ten year
requirement, one-tenth of the covered labor supply, on the
average, would be mobile each year and such mobility would
seem to satisfy the requirements for employee reallocation
within the economy. The required period should not be al-
lowed to exceed ten years, however, because this period repre-
sents about one-fourth the typical working life of an employee
and loss of benefits after such a period would result in a sub-
stantial reduction of his retirement security. 24
It should be reiterated that other problem areas, previ-
ously discussed, need reexamination. It is submitted that the
relative standard should prevail in defining highly compensated
employees. Also, the allowance of required contributions up to
six per cent is objectionable. To low salaried employees, those
in greatest need of pension benefits, a required contribution of
121. See Goldworn, supra note 112, at 258.
122. See, e.g., Sherwood Swan & Co., 42 T.C. 299 (1964); Ryan School
Retirement Trust, 24 T.C. 127 (1955).
123. REPORT TO PRESIDENT, supra note 112, at vii.
124. See Surrey, supra note 109, at 71,090.
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six per cent might very well result in their declining such a
plan. 125
To the extent that plans providing for a substantial segment
of the rank and file employees are not encouraged, the pension
provisions fail in their societal task of mitigating post-retirement
poverty and perform the sole function of allowing upper-level
employees to defer income at a cost of over one billion dollars per
annum to the public.
125. See Ray Cleaners, Inc., 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 23 (1968).
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